

Core Consultative Group meeting

Minutes of meeting – Final

21st of September 2018 Conference Call

	Party	Country
Market Participant / Association	EDF	France
	CITADEL	UK
	Market Parties Platform	CWE
	ACER	N/A
	EFET	N/A
	STATKRAFT	Germany
	CEZ	Czech Republic
	ENGIE	Belgium
Core NRAs	ERU (P. CIREK)	Czech Republic
	BNetzA (R. TUTTMANN)	Germany
	ANRE (A. SELISCHI)	Romania
	CRE (S. BOUSSETTA)	France
Core TSOs	AMPRION (K. TREPPER)	Germany
	TRANSELECTRICA (G. VISAN)	Romania
	ELIA (G. MAES)	Belgium
	TENNET BV (M. DE HAAS)	Netherlands
PMO	MAGNUS (L. JAFFRE)	Netherlands

List of Abbreviations

1. Welcome and introduction

G. VISAN (Transelectrica) welcomes all participants on behalf on new chairman of the Core CCR. K. TREPPER (Amprion) introduces herself as being the new convener for Core Stakeholder activities. She reminds that Core TSOs started the public consultation for CACM 35 obligation (coordinated redispatching and countertrading) on September 5th 2018. The public consultation will last until October 5th. The aim of today's conference call is to answer Market Parties first questions on the draft methodology and explanatory note.

2. Q&A

The following questions and remarks are raised by the market participants during the conference call:

Q&A regarding CACM 35 RD&CT Draft Methdology and Explanatory Note

- [Methodology. Art 17] As the implementation start of Core RD & CT Methodology depends on other regulatory approvals, do Core TSOs plan on waiting for these approvals or do they plan on starting in advance? Market Parties see advantages of an early implementation (coordinating amongst Core TSOs would reduce overall the costs of remedial actions)
 - Core TSOs feedback: TSOs have to decide on the implementation date, taking into account the links with other relevant regulations.
- [Explanatory Note section 4.1] Market Parties thank Core TSOs for reflecting the discussions of last Core CG 28/06 meeting in the definition of redispatching (redispatching can be a mix of redispatching and countertrading, instead of being pairwise). However, Market Parties notice that the definition in the methodology is not aligned with the explanatory note (section 4.1, paragraph 3).
 - Core TSOs feedback: Core TSOs agree with Market Parties Core TSOs take note of Market Parties feedback.
- [Methodology Art. 4.1] Do you foresee local obligations that could prevent some parties from sharing their information? Can you specify the reason to use "could" in the sentence "All relevant market parties shall have the obligation based on local legislations to provide best up-to-date information on the resources that could be used by TSOs for Redispatching"? Market Parties would like to ensure that RSCs perform an optimization on all available resources.
 - Core TSOs feedback: The sharing of the information depends amongst others on the availability of the resource and also on the limitations on national level. SO GL 76 methodology will provide more insights on what can be shared. Market parties suggest to change the wording into "can" instead of "could". This request can be submitted during the consultation process.
- [Methodology Art. 4.1.d] Market Parties wonder about the relevance of 4.1.d "Up and/or down regulation of battery storages or other storage technologies". They stress that it is better to detail by type of restrictions rather than by type of technologies. RSCs should have a view on all possibilities including the potential restrictions. Otherwise there is the risk that the result of the optimization will not be optimal.
 - Core TSOs feedback: Core TSOs want to have as many resources as possible available to solve any overloads in the grid. Any restrictions like lead time for activation etcetera will be taken into account by the optimisation principles of SO GL 76. Article 4 only lists possible resources which can be offered (but not limited to this list)
- [Methodology Art. 5.1] Market Parties would welcome explanations from TSOs on how the decision is made for sharing the resources for countertrading, what could be the barriers locally for sharing it (this remark is also valid for 4.1)
 - Core TSOs feedback: A proposal considering several options has been provided to NRAs for their shadow opinion.
- [Methodology Art. 2] Based on the definitions (upward and downward activation of a single asset and a merit order based counterbalancing), it should be well considered throughout the methodology that the impact and cost of

redispatching is not fully certain. Market Parties highlight that it could be useful to include basic examples in the explanatory note showing how Core TSOs assess the impact of some RD & CT actions, what kind of parameters are used to take into account the uncertainty of the impact etc.

- Core TSOs feedback: Such examples are more related to SO GL 76 which will define these parameters and also take into account non-costly remedial actions. This is part of the optimization principle as a whole.
- [Explanatory note section 9] Does the optimization algorithm already exist? When will an industrialized tool be ready?
 Core TSOs feedback: There is already some proof of concept performed by some TSOs and RSCS. The readiness of the industrialized tool is related to the implementation of SO GL 76 methodology.
- [Methodology Art. 8.1.a] Are all available Redispatching and Countertrading resources supposed to be exchanged? Is there any obligation to share them all? Market Parties would welcome having all resources available per default and to describe case by case the situations for which they are not available. Market Parties do not understand why there is already a restriction at the beginning of the process. It should not be up to the TSOs to decide which resource is useful or not (it should be up to the RSCs).
 - Core TSOs feedback: It depends on the availability of the resource at a specific time and on the national legislations. Example1: The development of Art 35 CACM and Art 76 SO GL is done on CCR level and the majority of the TSOs is part of several CCRs. Therefore some RDCT resources might be reserved for being used in a specific CCR because of their significant influence on a BZB of this CCR rather than of others. Example 2: some congestions take place in parts of the TSO grid that are not monitored by the RSC (lower voltage levels local transmission grid), so that a TSO would have to keep some RD resources (having a significant impact on the local congestion) in order to be able to solve such congestions.
- [Methodology Art. 8.4] How do TSOs decide to perform more than one CSA? Is it a stepwise approach?
 - Core TSOs feedback: See overview of CSA process in the explanatory note. This will be further defined in the SO GL 76 methodology.
- [Methodology Art. 9.3] Will Core TSOs detail the necessary frequency on which the changes of remedial actions data intraday shall be monitored? How will you determine it?
 - o Core TSOs feedback: Each time there is a CSA in ID, the remedial actions have to be updated.
- [Methodology Art. 15.1] Market Parties would welcome more details on what TSOs intend to report to meet the requirements of the transparency regulations.
 - o Core TSOs feedback: The list of requirements can be found directly in the regulations.
- Market Parties remark that it could be useful that TSOs publish forecasted actions (and not only the triggered ones). Some TSOs already do this (ex: DE TSOs publish early curtailment).

As no more questions are raised, Katrin TREPPER closes the conference call. Market Parties inform that they appreciate the level of details provided in the public consultation documents and their early involvement in the process. Core TSOs thank stakeholders for providing valuable inputs.